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We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use
what is perhaps the most basic nancial strategy, called \value investing", i.e. systematically
attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price uctuations of the
asset are approximately normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. This changes when the
funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, which allows them to purchase more assets
than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times funds that use more leverage have
higher prots, increasing their wealth and making them dominant in the market. However, if a
downward price uctuation occurs while one or more funds are fully leveraged, the resulting margin
call causes them to sell into an already falling market, amplifying the downward price movement.
If the funds hold large positions in the asset this can cause substantial losses. This in turns leads to
clustered volatility: Before a crash, when the value funds are dominant, they damp volatility, and
after the crash, when they suer severe losses, volatility is high. This leads to power law tails which
are both due to the leverage-induced crashes and due to the clustered volatility induced by the
wealth dynamics. This is in contrast to previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility,
which depended on \irrational behavior", such as trend following. A standard (supposedly more
sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes
leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility gets
high, making these extreme uctuations even worse.
JEL: E32, E37, G01, G12, G14
Keywords: systemic risk, clustered volatility, fat tails, crash, margin calls, leverage
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent events in nancial markets have underscored
the dangerous consequences of the use of excessive credit.
At the most basic level the problem is obvious: If a rm
buys assets with borrowed money, then under extreme
market conditions it may owe more money than it has
and default. If this happens on a suciently wide scale
then it can severely stress creditors and cause them to
fail as well.
We show here that a special but extremely widespread
kind of credit called collateralized loans with margin calls
has a more pervasive eect: when used excessively it can
cause default and crashes, but it also leaves a signature
even when there is no default or crash. These kinds of
loans have already been identied as a major culprit in
the recent crisis, and in previous near crises as well1. But
we show here that they create a dynamic in asset price
uctuations that manifests itself at all time scales and to
all degrees. The extraordinary crisis of the last couple of
years is just one extreme (but not extremal) point on a
continuum.
1 For previous equilibrium-based analyses of leverage, which show
that prices crash before default actually occurs, see references
[1{5].
By taking out a collateralized loan a buyer of stocks
or mortgage backed securities can put together a portfo-
lio that is worth a multiple of the cash he has available
for their purchase. In 2006 this multiple or \leverage"
reached 60 to 1 for AAA rated mortgage securities, and
16 to 1 for what are now called the toxic mortgage secu-
rities. The outstanding volume of these leveraged asset
purchases reached many trillions of dollars. Leverage has
uctuated up and down in long cycles over the last 30
years.
Conventional credit is for a xed amount and a xed
maturity, extending over the period the borrower needs
the money. In a collateralized loan with margin calls, the
debt is guaranteed not by the reputation (or punishment)
of the borrower, but by an asset which is conscated if
the loan is not repaid. Typically the loan maturity is
very short, say a day, much shorter than the length of
time the borrower anticipates needing the money. The
contract usually species that after the daily interest is
paid, as long as the loan to asset value ratio remains be-
low a specied threshold, the debt is rolled over another
day (up to some nal maturity, when the threshold ratio
might be changed). If, however, the collateral asset value
falls, the lender makes a margin call and the borrower is
expected to repay part of the debt and so roll over a
smaller loan to maintain the old loan to value threshold.
Quite often the borrower will obtain the cash for this ex-
tra downpayment by selling some of the collateral. The2
nature of the collateralized loan contract thus sometimes
turns buyers of the collateral into sellers, even when they
might think it is the best time to buy.
Such an eect is well known to every hedge fund man-
ager who uses leverage. It was discussed informally in
[6, 7] where it was noted that leveraged value investors
may cause mispricings to increase when they hit mar-
gin limits. [3] presents an explicit model of leverage and
prices and solves for the equilibrium leverage and prices
when every agent is fully rational. There the margin call
eect is compounded by an increase in the endogenous
equilibrium haircut. However the model extends only for
three periods, with just two possible shocks each period.
We provide a quantitative dynamic model with arbitrar-
ily many periods and continuous shocks of all sizes. This
allows us to study how value investors decrease volatility
under most circumstances, but occasionally dramatically
increase volatility and generate crashes. It also allows us
to examine the statistical signature of leveraged trading
and to compare statistical measures of returns, such as
kurtosis, in our model with measures obtained from ac-
tual data. In our model fat tails and clustered volatility
are statistically testable properties. By contrast, in the
purely descriptive commentary in [7], they can only sug-
gest that price changes will be bigger than the shocks to
fundamentals.
Needless to say, the higher the loan to value, or equiv-
alently, the higher the leverage ratio of asset value to
cash downpayment, the more severe will be the feedback
mechanism. A buyer who is at his threshold of  times
leveraged loses % of his investment for every 1% drop in
the asset price, and on top of that will have to come up
with $( 1)= of new cash for every $1 drop in the price
of the asset. When there is no leverage, and  = 1; there
is no feedback, but as the leverage increases, so does the
feedback.
The feedback from falling asset prices to margin calls
to the transformation of buyers into sellers back to falling
asset prices creates a nonlinear dynamic to the system.
The nonlinearity rises as the leverage rises. This non-
linear feedback would be present in the most sophisti-
cated rational expectations models or in the most simple
minded behavioral models: it is a mechanical eect that
stems directly from the nonlinear dynamics caused by the
use of leverage and margin calls. We therefore build the
simplest model possible and then simulate it over tens
of thousands of periods, measuring and quantifying the
eect of leverage on asset price uctuations2.
Our model provides a new explanation for the fat tails
and clustered volatility that are commonly observed in
price uctuations [8, 9]. Clustered volatility and fat tails
emerge in the model on a broad range of time scales, in-
2 The nonlinear feedback that we describe here, which is driven by
investors selling into a falling market, is in this sense similar to
the model of hedging by [6]; they also discuss how such feedbacks
can cause crashes.
cluding very rapid ones and very slow ones. Mandelbrot
and Engle found that actual price uctuations did not
display the independent and normally distributed prop-
erties assumed by the pioneers of classical nance [10, 11].
Though their work has been properly celebrated, no con-
sensus has formed on the mechanism which creates fat
tails and clustered volatility. The mechanism we develop
here supports the hypothesis that they are caused by the
endogenous dynamics of the market rather than the na-
ture of information itself { in our model information is
normally distributed and IID, but when leverage is used,
the resulting prices are not.
Previous endogenous explanations assume the presence
of a kind of trader who exacerbates uctuations. Traders
in these models are of at least two types: value investors,
who make investments based on fundamentals, and trend
followers, who make investments in the direction of re-
cent price movements3. Trend followers are inherently
destabilizing, and many would dispute whether such be-
havior is rational. Value investors, in contrast, are es-
sential to maintain a reasonably ecient market: They
gather information about valuations, and incorporate it
into prices. Thus in this sense value investing is ratio-
nal. In typical models of this type, investors move their
money back and forth between trend strategies and value
strategies, depending on who has recently been more suc-
cessful, and fat tails and clustered volatility are generated
by temporary increases in destabilizing trend strategies.
The mechanism that we propose here for fat tails and
clustered volatility only involves value investors, who are
stabilizing in the absence of leverage. We do not claim
that our mechanism for making fat tails is the only possi-
ble mechanism { indeed it likely coexists with the myopic
learning mechanism reviewed above, and may also coex-
ist with other mechanisms, such as fat tails in exogenous
information arrival.
An important aspect of our model is that even though
the risk control policies used by the individual bank
lenders are reasonable from a narrow, bank-centric point
of view, when a group of banks inadvertently acts to-
gether, they can dramatically aect prices, inducing non-
linear behavior at a systemic level that gives rise to exces-
sive volatility and even crashes. Attempts to regulate risk
without taking into account systemic eects can backre,
accentuating risks or even creating new ones.4
The wealth dynamics in our model illustrate the inter-
action between evolutionary dynamics that occur on very
long time scales, and short term dynamics that occur on
timescales of minutes. In our model dierent agents use
dierent levels of leverage. Agents who use more lever-
age produce higher returns and attract more investment
3 See [12{14, 17{21]. See also [22], who induce bubbles and crashes
via myopic learning dynamics.
4 Another good example from the recent meltdown illustrating how
individual risk regulation can create systemic risk is the use of
derivatives.3
capital, and as time goes on the most aggressive investors
accumulate more wealth. Whereas funds normally damp
price uctuations by buying when the price falls, if they
are fully leveraged, the margin call caused by a small
downward price uctuation can force them to sell into
a falling market. In the early stages of a bubble, when
the wealth of the funds is low, their positions are small,
their impact on the market is low, and this is relatively
harmless. However, in the later stages, when the combi-
nation of fund wealth and leverage are large, the impact
is correspondingly large, and a relatively small downward
price movement can trigger a crash.
The above scenario illustrates the evolutionary pres-
sure driving funds toward toward higher and higher lever-
age. During stable periods in the market, funds that use
large leverage grow at the expense of those who do not,
and acquire more and more market power, while funds
that do not employ sucient leverage lose investment
capital. Even if fund managers are aware of the danger
of using leverage, the pressure of short term competition
may force them to do so. Regulating leverage is thus good
for everyone, preventing behavior that all are driven to
yet none desire.
The leverage eect that we explore here is just one ex-
ample of many types of nonlinear positive feedback that
are often referred to as \pro-cyclical behavior" in the eco-
nomics literature. Other examples include stop-loss or-
ders, exercise of put or call options, trend-following and
dynamic hedging strategies. All of these have the com-
mon feature that they generate additional buying or sell-
ing in the direction the price is already moving, thereby
amplifying a pre-existing trend. Furthermore, with the
exception of trend following, these are all essentially me-
chanical eects that, once contracts are in place, can lead
to the amplication of price movements without any fur-
ther decision making. Our work here is in the spirit of
the pioneering paper of Kim and Markowitz [24], who
simulated dynamic hedging strategies believed to be in-
volved in the crash of 1987 and demonstrated their ef-
fect on time series of prices. The destabilizing eects of
derivatives have been studied in [15, 16].
We wish to emphasize that we do not claim here that
excessive borrowing by hedge funds caused the liquidity
crisis of 2007 onwards. This work is instead designed
to illustrate the general problems associated with lever-
age. The heavy-tailed price movements we demonstrate
here, which are caused by selling into a falling market,
should be observed in any situation where there are col-
lateralized loans with margin calls, whether or not the
borrowers are value investors5.
5 The failure of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 was an
example of a near-crisis caused by the precise mechanism dis-
cussed here. Some other types of investment strategies, such as
trend-following or portfolio insurance, cause nonlinear feedback
in prices, which is further amplied by leverage.
2. THE MODEL
In our model, traders have a choice between owning a
single asset, such as a stock or a commodity, or owning
cash. There are two types of traders, noise traders and
funds. The noise traders buy and sell nearly at random,
with a slight bias that makes the price weakly mean-
revert around a perceived fundamental value V . The
funds use a strategy that exploits mispricings by taking a
long position (holding a net positive quantity of the asset)
when the price is below V , and otherwise staying out of
the market. The funds can augment the size of their
long position by borrowing from a bank at an interest
rate that for simplicity we x at zero, using the asset as
collateral. This borrowing is called leverage. The bank
will of course be careful to limit its lending so that the
value of what is owed is less than the current price of the
assets held as collateral. Default occurs if the asset price
falls suciently far before the loan comes due in the next
period.
In addition to the two types of traders there is a rep-
resentative investor who either invests in a fund or holds
cash. The amount she invests in a given fund depends
on its recent historical performance relative to a bench-
mark return rb. Thus successful funds attract additional
capital above and beyond what they gain in the market
and similarly unsuccessful funds lose additional capital.
2.1. Supply and Demand
The total supply of the asset is N: At the beginning
of each period t  1 all agents observe the unit asset
price p(t): As is traditional, all the traders in our model
are perfectly competitive; they take the price as given,
imagining that they are so small that they cannot aect
the price, no matter how much they demand.
2.1.1. Noise traders
The noise traders' demand is dened in terms of the
cash value nt(t) they spend on the asset, which follows
an autoregressive random process of order one of the form
lognt(t) = lognt(t   1) + (t) + (1   )log(V N);
where  is normally distributed with mean zero and stan-





When there are only noise traders the price is set such
that Dnt(t;p(t)) = N. This choice of the noise trader
process guarantees that with  < 1 the price is a mean
reverting random process with E[logp] = logV .
When there are only noise traders the log price fol-
lows an AR(1) process and so is normally distributed.4



















FIG. 1: Demand function Dh(t)p(t) of a fund (measured in
dollars) vs. the mispricing signal m(t) = V   p(t). The in-
vestor does nothing when the asset is overpriced, and she buys
more and more as the asset becomes underpriced, until she
hits her leverage limit at m = m
crit. After this her demand
remains at.
However, the returns r(t) = log(p(t)=p(t   1)) are some-
what more heavy tailed than normal. Furthermore the
mean reversion introduces a slight amount of clustered
volatility. Both of these facts are shown in the appendix.
For the purposes of this paper we x V = 1, N = 1000,
 = 0:035 and  = 0:99. The choice of   1 ensures that
the deviation from normality is minimal; with  = 0:99
the typical uctuation in volatility is about 1%.
2.1.2. Funds
We add a second class of demanders called funds. The
funds in our model are value investors who base their de-
mand Dh(t) on a mispricing signal m(t) = V  p(t). The
perceived fundamental value V is held constant and is the
same for the noise traders and for all funds. As shown in
Figure 1, each fund h computes its demand Dh(t) based
on the mispricing. As the mispricing increases, the dollar
value Dh(t)p(t) of the asset the fund wishes to hold in-
creases linearly, but the position size is capped when the
fund reaches the maximum leverage. Funds dier only
according to an aggression parameter h that represents
how sensitive their response is to the signal m:
Each fund begins with the same wealth Wh(0) = 2.
After noting the price p(t); at each date t  1 hedge fund
h computes its wealth Wh(t) = Wh(t;p(t)), as described
in the next section. The fund must split its wealth Wh(t)
between cash Ch(t) and the value of the asset Dh(t)p(t)
Wh(t) = Wh(t;p(t)) = Dh(t)p(t) + Ch(t)
When the fund is borrowing money, Ch(t) is negative and
represents the loan amount. If Wh(t;p(t))  0, the fund's
demand Dh(t) = Dh(t;p(t)) can be written:
m(t) < 0 : Dh(t) = 0 (1)
0 < m < mcrit
h : Dh(t) = hm(t)Wh(t)=p(t) (2)
m  mcrit
h : Dh(t) = MAXWh(t)=p(t): (3)
In (1) the asset is over-priced and the fund holds noth-
ing. In (2) the asset is underpriced but the mispricing
is not too large. The fund takes a position whose mon-
etary value is proportional to the mispricing m(t), the
fund's wealth Wh(t), and the aggression parameter h,
which can vary from fund to fund. In (3) the asset is
even more underpriced so that the fund has reached its
maximum leverage h(t) = MAX. This occurs when
m(t)  mcrit
h = MAX=h.
The leverage h is the ratio of the dollar value of the








The fund is required by the bank it borrows from to main-
tain h(t)  MAX: If  h(t) = Dh(t   1)p(t)=Wh(t) >
MAX; the fund will have to sell the asset in order to
bring leverage h(t) under the maximum allowed. This
is called meeting a margin call.
Note that a k% change in the asset price from p(t 1)
to p(t) causes a  h(t)k% change in wealth Wh(t), hence
the name \leverage". A fund that satised its leverage
limit at time t   1 might face a margin call at time t
either because  h(t) > 1 and p(t) falls below p(t   1);
causing Wh(t) to fall by a larger percentage than the
asset price, or because Wh(t) falls below Wh(t   1) due
to redemptions, described in the next section.
If Wh(t) < 0; the fund defaults and goes out of busi-
ness. The fund sells all its assets, demanding Dh(t) = 0;
and returns all the revenue to pay o as much of its bor-
rowed money as it can to its bank lender. The bank
bears the loss of the default. For simplicity, we assume
the bank has deep pockets and, despite the loss, contin-
ues to lend to other funds as before. After a period of
time has passed, the defaulting fund reemerges again as
a new fund, as we shall describe below.
Prices are set by equating the demand of the funds





2.2. Fund Wealth Dynamics
The funds' wealth automatically grows or shrinks ac-
cording to the success or failure of their trading. In addi-
tion it changes due to additions or withdrawals of money
by investors, as described below. If a fund's wealth goes5
below a critical threshold, here set to Wh(0)=10, the fund
goes out of business6, and after a period of time, Treintro,
has passed it is replaced by a new fund with wealth Wh(0)
and the same parameters h and MAX. In the simula-
tions we use Treintro = 100 timesteps.
A pool of fund investors, who are treated as a single
representative investor, contribute or withdraw money
from each fund based on a moving average of its recent
performance. This kind of behavior is well documented7.
Let
rh(t) =
Dh(t   1)(p(t)   p(t   1))
Wh(t   1)
be the rate of return by fund h on investments at time t.
The investors make their decisions about whether to in-
vest in the fund based on r
perf
h (t), an exponential moving
average of these performances, dened as
r
perf
h (t) = (1   a)r
perf
h (t   1) + arh(t): (5)
The ow of capital in or out of the fund, Fh(t), is given
by
~ Fh(t) = b [r
perf
h (t)   rb] [Dh(t   1)p(t) + Ch(t   1)] (6)
Fh(t) = max( ~ Fh(t); [Dh(t   1)p(t) + Ch(t   1)]); (7)
where b is a parameter controlling how sensitive the per-
centage contributions or withdrawals are to returns and
rb is the benchmark return of the investors. The investors
cannot take out more money than the fund has.
Funds are initially given wealth W0 = Wh(0). At the
beginning of each new timestep t  1, the wealth of the
fund changes according to
Wh(t) = Wh(t 1)+[p(t) p(t 1)]Dh(t 1)+Fh(t): (8)
In the simulations in this paper, unless otherwise stated
we set a = 0:1, b = 0:15, rb = 0:005, and W0 = 2.
The benchmark return rb plays the important role of
determining the relative size of hedge funds vs. noise
traders. If the benchmark return is set very low then
funds will become very wealthy and will buy a large quan-
tity of the asset under even small mispricings, preventing
the mispricing from ever growing large. This eectively
induces a hard oor on prices. If the benchmark return
is set very high, funds accumulate little wealth and play
a negligible role in price formation. The interesting be-
havior is observed at intermediate values of rb where the
funds' demand is comparable to that of the noise traders.
6 Using a positive survival threshold for removing funds avoids the
creation of \zombie funds" that persist for long periods of time
with almost no wealth.
7 Some of the references that document or discuss the ow of in-
vestors in and out of mutual funds include [[25{29]].
2.3. A few remarks about the model
2.3.1. Lack of short-selling and its consequences
We have intentionally avoided short selling because
short positions are inherently riskier than long positions.
With an unleveraged long-only position it is not possible
to lose more than one owns. In contrast, with a short
position it is possible to lose an arbitrarily large amount,
even without leverage. Because we wanted to be able
to switch o excess riskiness completely, we intentionally
kept short selling out of this model.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it makes the
model explicitly unrealistic in ways that need to be taken
into account when interpreting the results. When the
asset is overpriced long-only funds are entirelyout of the
market, which can cause strong asymmetries in the prop-
erties of prices. Since the funds normally damp excur-
sions from fundamentals, it can mean that the volatility
is higher when the asset is overpriced than when it is
underpriced. Mixing the two cases together would result
in articially induced heavy tails and give an articial
impression of clustered volatility. The predictions of the
model are only relevant when the asset is underpriced
and we therefore condition our analyses on the asset be-
ing underpriced.
2.3.2. Trend following in wealth dynamics
The wealth dynamics of the funds involves a represen-
tative investor who takes her money in or out of the fund
based on its recent performance. We introduced this into
our model because it guarantees a steady-state behavior,
with well-dened long term statistical averages. Without
this the wealth of the funds grows without bound, since
the funds consistently prot at the expense of the noise
traders. This causes the price to eventually \freeze" with
the value V as a oor due to the fact that any under-
pricing is immediately corrected by the funds. Since the
wealth dynamics we have chosen is a form of trend fol-
lowing, it unfortunately introduces some confusion about
the source of the heavy tails that we observe here. As we
explain later, based on various experiments we are con-
dent that the wealth dynamics of the investors is not the
source of the heavy tails.
3. SIMULATION RESULTS
3.1. Wealth dynamics
In Fig. 2 we illustrate the wealth dynamics for a sim-
ulation with 10 funds whose aggression parameters are
h = 5;10;:::;50. They all begin with the same low
wealth Wh(0) = 2; at the outset they make good returns
and their wealth grows quickly. This is particularly true6






































FIG. 2: Wealth timeseries Wh(t) for 10 funds with h = 5;10;:::;50 and MAX = 20 for all funds. Times at which (at least)
one fund collapses are marked by triangles.
for the most aggressive funds; with higher leverage they
make higher returns so long as the asset price is increas-
ing. As their wealth grows the funds have more impact,
i.e. they themselves aect prices, driving them up when
they are buying and down when they are selling. This
limits their prot-making opportunities and imposes a
ceiling of wealth at about W = 40. There are a series
of crashes which cause defaults, particularly for the most
highly leveraged funds. Twice during the simulation, at
around t = 10;000 and 25;000, crashes wipe out all but
the two least aggressive funds with h = 5;10. While
funds 3   10 wait to get reintroduced, fund 2 man-
ages to become dominant for extended periods of time.
3.2. Returns and correlations
The presence of the funds dramatically alters the sta-
tistical properties of price returns. This is illustrated in
Fig. 3, where we compare the distribution of logarithmic
price returns r(t) = logp(t) logp(t 1), for three cases:
(1) Noise traders only. (2) Hedge funds with no leverage
(MAX = 1). (3) Substantial leverage, i.e. MAX = 10.
With only noise traders the log returns are (by construc-
tion) nearly normally distributed. When funds are added
without leverage the volatility of prices drops slightly,
but the log returns remain approximately normally dis-
tributed. When we increase leverage to MAX = 10,
however, the distribution becomes much more concen-
trated in the center and the negative returns develop fat
tails. (Recall that since the funds are long-only, they are
only active when the asset is undervalued, i.e. when the
mispricing m > 0. This creates an asymmetry between
positive and negative returns.) As shown in Fig. 3(b),
for MAX = 10 the cumulative distribution for the most
negative returns roughly follows a straight line in a dou-
ble logarithmic scale, suggesting that it is reasonable to
approximate the tails of the distribution as a power law,
of the form P(r > Rjm > 0)  R .
The exponent  may be regarded as a measure of the
concentration of extreme risks, and a low value of  im-
plies fat tails. The transition from normality to fat tails
occurs more or less continuously as MAX varies. This is
in contrast to the conjecture of Plerou et al.[23, 31{33]
that  has a universal value   3. In Figure 3(c) we
measure  as a function of MAX. As MAX increases
 decreases, corresponding to heavier tails8. This trend
continues until MAX  10, where  reaches a oor at
  2:5. (The reason this oor exists depends on the par-
ticular choice of parameters here, and will be explained
later). A typical value measured for nancial time series,
such as American stocks [23, 34], is   3. In our model
this corresponds to a maximum leverage MAX  7:5. It
is perhaps a coincidence that 7:5 is the maximum lever-
age allowed for equity trading in the United States, but
in any case this demonstrates that the numbers produced
by this model are reasonable.
In Fig. 4 we show the log-returns r(t) as a function of
time. The case MAX = 1 is essentially indistinguishable
from the pure noise trader case; there are no large uctua-
tions and little temporal structure. The case MAX = 10,
in contrast, shows large, temporally correlated uctua-
tions. The autocorrelation function shown in panel (c) is
similar to that observed in real price series. This suggests
that this model may also explain clustered volatility [8].
8 We measured  using a Hill estimator [30] based on the largest
10% of the returns. The value of  when  = 1 should be innite,
in contrast to the measured value. Large values of  are dicult
to measure correctly, whereas small values are measured much
more accurately.7









































































FIG. 3: The distribution of log returns r. (a) plots the density
of log returns p(rjm > 0) on semi-log scale. The results are
conditioned on positive mispricing m > 0, i.e. only when the
funds are active. The unleveraged case (red circles) closely
matches the noise trader only case (red curve). When the
maximum leverage is raised to ten (blue squares) the body of
the distribution becomes thinner but the tails become heavy
on the negative side. This is seen from a dierent point of view
in (b), which plots the cumulative distribution for negative
returns, P(r > Rjm > 0), in log-log scale. For MAX = 10 we
t a power law to the data across the indicated region and
show a line for comparison. In (c) we vary MAX and plot
tted values of , illustrating how the tails become heavier as
the leverage increases. Same  values as in Figure 2.



































































FIG. 4: Log-return timeseries (a) MAX = 1; (b) MAX = 10.
Triangles mark margin calls in the simulation, indicating a di-
rect connection between large price moves and margin calls.
(c) Autocorrelation function of the absolute values of log-
returns for (a-b) obtained from a single run with 100;000
timesteps. This is plotted on log-log scale in order to illus-
trate the power law tails. (The autocorrelation function is
computed only when the mispricing is positive.) Same  val-
ues as in Figure 2.8


























FIG. 5: Change in demand dD=dm as a result of an innitesi-
mal increase in the mispricing from the mispricing m = V  p
prevailing last period. dD=dm > 0 means the fund buys when
the mispricing increases, and dD=dm < 0 means the fund
sells when the mispricing increases. Here the fund has  = 10
and W = 1. When the maximum leverage MAX = 1 and
m < MAX= = 0:1 the fund responds to an increased mis-
pricing by buying, and when m > 0:1 the fund neither buys
nor sells (it holds its position). When MAX = 2 the fund
continues to buy until MAX= = 0:2, but sells for m > 0:2.
When MAX = 3 the fund sells heavily for m > 0:3. Finally,
when MAX = 1, the fund gradually begins selling anyway.
4. HOW LEVERAGE INDUCES NONLINEAR
FEEDBACK AND CLUSTERED VOLATILITY
4.1. When do the funds sell?
The fat tails of price movements in our model are ex-
plained by a combination of the nonlinear positive feed-
back caused by leveraging, which causes crashes, and the
wealth dynamics of the value funds. When the funds
are unleveraged, they will always buy into a falling mar-
ket, i.e. when the price is dropping they are guaranteed
to be buyers, thus damping price movements away from
the fundamental value. When they are leveraged, how-
ever, this situation is sometimes reversed { if they are
maximally leveraged they sell into a falling market, thus
amplifying the deviation of price movements away from
fundamental value.
This is easily understood by dierentiating the fund's
demand function given in Eq. (2-3) with respect to the
mispricing. Ignoring the slow moving fund deposits and
redemptions F(t), write W(t) = D(t 1)p(t)+C(t 1).
Recalling that m = V   p(t) and dierentiating gives
For m < mcrit : dD=dm = 






For m > mcrit : dD=dm =
MAXC(t   1)
(V   m)2 :
As long as the fund always remains unleveraged, the cash
C(t   1) is always positive and the derivative of the de-
mand with the mispricing is always positive. This means
the fund always buys as the price is falling. In contrast,
when the fund is leveraged then C(t 1) is negative. This
means that the fund is always selling as the price is falling
when it is above its leverage limit, and depending on the
circumstances, it may start selling even before then.
To visualize this more clearly, consider the derivative
at the value of the mispricing at the last period, m =
V   p(t   1). At that point, ignoring redemptions, we
can assume that D(t   1) and C(t   1) are chosen so
that for m < mcrit the fraction of the wealth held in the
asset is Dp=W = m and the fraction held in cash is
C=W = 1 m. Similarly, if the fund is over its leverage
limit we can assume that the fraction of the wealth held
in the asset is Dp=W = MAX, and the fraction held is
cash is C=W = 1   MAX. This implies that the rate
of buying or selling under an innitesimal change in the
mispricing from last period is





(V   m)2 ;





(V   m)2 :
When the fund is leveraged then 1   MAX < 0, and
the second term is negative, so when m > mcrit the fund
always sells as the mispricing increases. If m2 > V then
the fund may sell as the mispricing increases even when
m < mcrit.
This is illustrated in Fig 5, where we plot the deriva-
tive of the fund's demand function, dD=dm, as a function
of the mispricing m. First consider the case where the
maximum leverage is one (MAX = 1). The fund buys as
the mispricing increases as long as the mispricing is small
enough that the leverage is under the leverage limit, i.e.
for m < mcrit = MAX= = 0:1. When the mispricing
becomes greater than this it simply holds its position.
In contrast, with a maximum leverage of two the critical
mispricing increases to mcrit = 0:2. The fund now buys
as the mispricing increases over a wider range of mis-
pricings, but switches over to selling when m > mcrit.
When the leverage is further increased to three, this ef-
fect becomes even stronger, i.e. the fund sells even more
aggressively while the price is falling.
Even when there is no cap on leverage, for a suciently
large mispricing the fund eventually becomes a seller as
the mispricing increases. This is a consequence of the fact
that we chose the demand function to be proportional
to wealth. When the mispricing becomes large enough
the decrease in wealth overwhelms the increase in the
mispricing, so the fund sells even without a margin call
from the bank. This can be viewed as a kind of risk
reduction strategy on the part of the fund.
By altering the margin call policy of the bank it is pos-
sible to eliminate the systemic risk eect entirely. Sup-
pose, for example, that rather than demanding debt re-
payment, the bank simply takes ownership of the shares9
of the fund9, and that the demand function of the fund
never causes them to sell into a falling market. In this
case there is no nonlinear feedback and no systemic risk
eect.
4.2. Nonlinear amplication of volatility
If the fund is leveraged, once the mispricing becomes
great enough it transitions from being a buyer to be-
ing a seller. When the fund is below the leverage limit
it damps volatility, for the simple reason that it buys
when the price falls, opposing and therefore damping
price movements. It is easy to show that with a rea-
sonably low leverage limit MAX, when  < MAX the
expected volatility E[r2
t] is damped by a factor approxi-
mately 1=(1+

N(Ch+DhV )) < 1 relative to the volatility
for noise traders alone, where N is the total number of
shares of the asset.
When funds reach their maximum leverage this re-
verses and funds instead amplify volatility. To remain
below MAX the fund is forced to sell when the price
falls. The volatility in this case is amplied by a fac-
tor approximately 1=(1   MAX
N V ) > 1. This creates a
positive feedback loop: Dropping prices cause funds to
sell, which causes a further drop in prices, which causes
funds to sell. This is clearly seen in Fig. 4(b), where we
have placed red triangles whenever at least one of the
funds is at its maximum leverage. All the largest nega-
tive price changes occur when leverage is at its maximum.
The amplication of volatility by leverage is illustrated
in Fig. 9(b) where we show that the average volatility
is an increasing function of the average leverage used by
the most aggressive fund.
Thus we see that under normal circumstances where
the banks impose leverage limits, the proximate cause of
the extreme price movements is the margin call, which
funds can meet only by selling and driving prices fur-
ther down. Of course we are not saying banks should not
maintain leverage at a reasonable level; we are only say-
ing that if they all maintain leverage at a similar level,
many funds may make margin calls at nearly the same
time, inducing an instability in prices. As we have al-
ready pointed out, this can be averted by using alterna-
tive risk control policies.
9 This actually happened when the Bear-Stearns hedge funds went
out of business; the bank attempted to sell the underlying assets,
but the liquidity was so low that they gave up and simply held
them.
4.3. How the leverage cycle drives volatility
clustering
The underlying cause of volatility clustering in this
model is the leverage cycle. To see how this occurs, as-
sume that we begin at a point where the wealth of all
funds is small (such as following a major market crash
in which all funds default). In the early stages all funds
tend to accumulate wealth, with aggressive funds growing
faster than cautious funds10. As shown in the previous
section, the overall increase in the wealth of funds low-
ers volatility. In addition, the increase in the wealth of
the most aggressive funds drives up the overall use of
leverage.
Eventually a substantial downward uctuation in noise
trader demand happens to occur at the same time that
one or more wealthy, aggressive funds are fully lever-
aged. This triggers a large sell-o by the aggressive funds,
which drives prices down, and generates a crash. After
the crash the overall wealth of funds is substantially di-
minished, and as a result volatility goes back up.
This is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the time
sequences of asset price returns before and after a crash.
Before the crash the overall wealth in funds is large and
as a consequence volatility is low; after the crash many
or most of the funds are wiped out and volatility is once
again high. The crash illustrated in Figure 7 is just one
of many, all of which follow a similar pattern: Averaging
over the 500 time steps before and after a crash, and
using standard deviation as the measure of volatility, the
average volatility before a crash is 0:018  0:003 and the
average volatility after a crash is 0:032  0:003, i.e. on
average it is nearly twice as much. This is the basic
mechanism underlying the clustered volatility driven by
the leverage cycle.
Note that in this model the deviation from normality of
the noise traders, which is needed in order to drive prices
toward their fundamental value, causes weak clustered
volatility. One might suspect that leverage is merely am-
plifying this eect. This is not the case: As we demon-
strate above, the primary causes of clustered volatility
are the leverage-induced crashes and the wealth dynam-
ics. While crashes are indeed triggered by small uctu-
ations of the noise traders, this amplication is highly
selective, and the wealth dynamics also plays an impor-
tant role. Thus it is not accurate to say that the leverage
10 There are two reasons why aggressive funds grow faster than
passive funds. The superior returns achieved by using leverage
both make the funds already under management grow faster and
attract new investors. As the wealth of the funds grows su-
ciently large, their market impact also grows, decreasing returns.
This can drive the returns of the less aggressive funds below the
benchmark return rb and cause them to lose investment capi-
tal. This explains the pattern seen in Figure 2, in which less
aggressive funds grow in the period right after a crash but then
eventually shrink.10





































FIG. 6: Anatomy of two crashes. Crashes are indicated by red triangles. From top to bottom we see (as a function of time):
(a) The wealth Wh of three representative funds whose aggression levels h range from highest to lowest. The wealth of the
most aggressive fund builds in the period leading up to the crash. (b) The average leverage tot, calculated by summing the
demand and wealth in Eq. 4 over all funds. (c) The noise trader demand . (d) The price p. (e) The uctuations in the noise
trader demand, .
merely amplies the clustered volatility caused by the
noise traders.
Another suspicion might be that the clustered volatil-
ity is driven by the trend following behavior of the in-
vestors, who pull their money in and out of the funds
based on past performance. This is true in the sense
that the investors' wealth dynamics aects the wealth
of the funds, which in turn modulates the amplication
of volatility. However this eect would occur even if no
money were moved in or out of the funds, due to the
prots and losses of the funds themselves. To test this
we have varied the parameter a, which sets the timescale
over which investors average the returns of the funds (see
Eq. (5)). When we vary a from 0:3 to 0:05 we see lit-
tle change in the observed behavior, illustrating that the
trend following of the investors is not essential.
4.4. Evolutionary pressure to increase leverage
There is also longer term evolutionary pressure driving
leverage up which comes from the wealth accumulation
process in this model, as illustrated in Figure 6. More
aggressive funds use higher leverage. During times when
there are no crashes, more aggressive funds make better
returns, attract more investment, and accumulate more
wealth, and are thus selected over less aggressive funds.
Thus on average, during good times the average leverage
used by the funds tends to increase, until there is a crash,
which preferentially wipes out most the most aggressive
funds and resets the average leverage to a lower level.
The wealth dynamics are illustrated in the top panel of
Figure 6. The total leverage is shown in the panel below
it. The leverage comes in bursts as mispricings develop,
but the size of these bursts tends to get bigger as the
relative wealth of the more aggressive funds increases.
The next panel illustrates the noise trader demand,
which is a weakly mean-reverting random process, and
the panel below it illustrates the price. During positive
excursions of the noise trader demand the asset is over-
priced, the funds stay out of the market, and the price is
equal to the noise trader demand (measured in dollars).
When the noise trader demand becomes negative the as-
set is underpriced, and under normal circumstances the11















FIG. 7: A typical example illustrating how the leverage cycle
drives volatility clustering. Before the crash the most ag-
gressive funds are wealthy, and under normal conditions their
tendency to buy on downward price moves damps volatility.
The crash occurs because the noise traders make a downward
demand uctuation while one or more of these funds are fully
leveraged, causing a large sello in an already falling market.
After the crash many funds are wiped out, causing volatility
to rise again. (Same parameters as previous gures).























fund 1−9;  
max=3
fund 10;  
max=1−10
FIG. 8: Demonstration of evolutionary pressure to increase
leverage. The maximum leverage is held constant at 
MAX =
3 for nine funds while 
MAX varies from 1 10 for the remain-
ing fund. The vertical axis shows the returns to investors,
with  = 20 for all funds and Treintro = 10. The fund with a
higher leverage limit gets better returns, and so attracts more
capital. Averages are taken over 50 independent simulations
of 100,000 timesteps each.
fund demand prevents the price from moving very far
below V . This is true until the rst crash occurs, where
the oor of demand provided by the funds collapses due
to margin calls, and the funds sell instead of buy as the
price falls, temporarily driving the price down even faster
than where it would be with noise traders alone.
Crashes are typically not caused by unusually large
uctuations in noise trader demand, as shown in the next
two panels. When the crashes occur the value of change
in the noise trader demand, (t) = (t)   (t   1) is
nothing out of the ordinary, and indeed for the exam-
ples given here it is not even one of the larger values in
the series. Nonetheless, the associated change in price,
p(t) = p(t)   p(t   1) is highly negative. Also one can
see that, while there is a very small amount of clustered
volatility due to the mean reversion in the demand uc-
tuations of the noise traders, this is enormously amplied
in the price uctuations.
To illustrate the evolutionary pressure toward higher
leverage explicitly, we have done simulations holding all
but one fund at a constant leverage MAX and sweeping
the maximum leverage of the last fund, as illustrated in
Fig. 8. For example, if the nine funds have MAX = 3, a
fund with MAX > 3 generates higher returns, as seen in
the gure, and thus accumulates wealth and becomes the
dominant fund. In a real world situation this would of
course put pressure on other fund managers to increase
their leverage. There is thus evolutionary pressure driv-
ing leverage up.
4.5. Better individual risk control can backre for
the system as a whole
In an attempt to achieve better risk control, banks of-
ten vary the maximum leverage based on the recent his-
torical volatility of the market, lowering maximum lever-
age when volatility has been high and raising it when it
has been low. This is prudent practice when lending to a
single fund. But this can be counterproductive when all
the funds might be deleveraging at the same time.
In Figure 9 we investigate an alternative leverage pol-
icy in which lenders tighten leverage restrictions when-
ever there is increased historical volatility. Maximum









where  = 100 is the bank's responsiveness to volatility,
and 2
 is the asset price variance computed over an in-
terval of  = 10 timesteps. For low values of maximum
leverage the number of defaults is about the same, but for
higher maximum leverage, in the range 7 < MAX < 15,
the number of defaults is greater with the variable lever-
age policy. The reason for this is simple: Lowering the
maximum leverage across all funds can cause massive sell-
ing at just the wrong time, creating more defaults rather
than less. Once again, an attempt to improve risk con-
trol that is sensible if one bank does it for one fund can
backre and create more risk if every bank does it with
every fund.
This kind of policy also has another important unin-
tended consequence. During times of low volatility lever-
age goes up. This in turn drives volatility up, which12
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FIG. 9: An illustration of how prices and volatility depend on
leverage and leverage policy. We explore two dierent bank
leverage policies. In the rst policy the maximum leverage
MAX is held constant (blue circles) and in the second it is var-
ied (red squares) so that maximum leverage decreases when
historical volatility increases according to equation (9). There
are 10 funds with the same  values as in Figure 2. Panel (a)
shows the default rates as function of maximum leverage, and
panels (b) and (c) show the average volatility and price as
a function of the average leverage 10 of the most aggressive
fund with the maximum leverage xed at MAX = 10. Volatil-
ity is computed as the average absolute value of logarithmic
price returns. Use of a volatility dependent leverage can in-
crease defaults, increase volatility, and drive prices further
away from fundamentals, even though the maximum lever-
age is always less than or equal to its value under the xed
leverage policy.
forces leverage back down. Thus, in such a situation there
are stochastic oscillations between leverage and volatil-
ity which on average drive volatility up and drive prices
further away from fundamentals. This is illustrated in
Fig. 9 (b) and (c), where we plot the average volatil-
ity and the average price as a function of the leverage
of the most leveraged fund. Note that the amplica-
tion of volatility occurs even though, under the variable
maximum leverage risk control protocol, the maximum
volatility is always less than or equal to its value under
the xed protocol.
5. CONCLUSION
The use of leverage in the economy is not just an es-
oteric matter relating to funds: It is unavoidable. It is
the mechanism through which most people are able to
own homes and corporations do business. Credit (and
thus leverage) is built into the fabric of society. The cur-
rent nancial crisis perfectly illustrates the dangers of
too much leverage followed by too little leverage. Like
Goldilocks, we are seeking a level that is \just right".
This raises the question of what that level is [35, 36].
We are not the rst to recognize the downward spiral
of margin calls [1{5, 7, 37]. After the Great Depression
the Federal Reserve was empowered to regulate margins
and leverage. However the model we have developed here
provides a quantiable and testable framework to explore
the consequences of leverage and its regulation. Recent
empirical work has found a correlation between leverage
and volatility [38], but our work suggests a more sub-
tle relationship. We make the falsiable prediction that
high leverage limits, such as we had in reality until very
recently, cause increased clustering of volatility and fat
tails, and that these eects should go up and down as
leverage goes up and down. This can work in parallel
with other eects that generate heavy tails, such as my-
opic learning.
During good times leverage tends to creep up, creating
a dangerous situation leading to a sudden crash in prices.
We have shown that when individual lenders seek to con-
trol risk through adjusting leverage, they may collectively
amplify risk. Our model can be used to search for a better
collective solution, perhaps coordinated through govern-
ment regulation.
At a broader level, this work shows how attempts to
regulate risk at a local level can actually generate risks
at a systemic level. The key element that creates the risk
is the nonlinear feedback on prices that is created due to
repaying loans at a bad time. This mechanism is actually
quite general, and also comes into play with other risk
control mechanisms, such as stop-loss orders and many
types of derivatives, whenever they generate buying or
selling in the same direction as price movement. We sus-
pect that this is a quite general phenomenon, that occurs
in many types of systems whenever optimization for risk
reduction is done locally without fully taking collective13
phenomena into account.
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Appendix: Properties of the noise trader process
In this appendix we show that for the parameters we
use here the noise trader process by itself has slightly non-
normal returns and weak clustered volatility. Assume
no funds, so that the dynamics are determined solely by
the noise traders. For convenience make the change of
notation yt = log(t), and for convenience let V = N =
1 (which only shifts the mean). The price is given by
Dnt = (t)=p(t) = N = 1 and the log price is logp(t) =
log(t) = y(t). The price dynamics become
y(t + 1) = y(t) + (t + 1): (10)
The noise (t) is normally distributed with zero mean.
The return r(t) is
r(t+1) = y(t+1) y(t) = ( 1)y(t)+(t+1): (11)
Squaring this and averaging gives
E[r(t)2jy(t)] = (   1)2y(t)2 + 2:
Thus the volatility varies conditionally on y(t), implying
that there is some clustered volatility even when only
noise traders are present. An estimate of the typical size
of y(t)2 can be made by squaring Eq.~ (10) and making
use of stationarity, which yields E[y(t)2] = 2=(1   )2.
Substituting in Eq.~ (11) gives a typical relative variation
in volatility of (1   )2=(1   2), which for  = 0:99 is
about 0:005. Thus the variation in volatility for the pure
noise trader process is small for the parameters we use
here, and vanishes in the limit  ! 1. The fact that
the variance uctuates means that the time series r(t) is
not identically distributed, and the marginal distribution
P(r) is a Gaussian mixture, which is slightly more heavy-
tailed than a normal distribution.